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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3891 
___________ 
 
GREGORY T. REDMOND, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
MONTGOMERY COUNTY;  
JUDGE VALENTINE, District Judge 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-06062) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 17, 2011 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 5, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Gregory T. Redmond appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  
For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
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 Redmond filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Montgomery County, and Magisterial District Judge 
Kathleen Valentine.  He contended that Judge Valentine deprived him of due process and 
his right to free speech by ruling against him – allegedly based on ex parte 
communications – in a case that he filed against Blue Ribbon Cleaners.  The District 
Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because Redmond’s 
claims against the Commonwealth were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Judge 
Valentine was absolutely immune from suit, and Redmond failed to allege facts that 
would support municipal liability against Montgomery County.  Redmond timely 
appealed. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may summarily affirm if 
no substantial question is presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 
10.6.  We agree with the District Court that neither the Commonwealth nor Judge 
Valentine is subject to liability in this case.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations 
of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy 
against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.”); Gallas v. Supreme Court of 
Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[J]udges are immune from suit under section 
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1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.”).1  We also agree that 
Redmond failed to state a claim against Montgomery County because he did not allege 
that the constitutional violations of which he complains stemmed from an official policy 
or custom of the county.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 
(1978).  Although district courts should generally provide a pro se plaintiff with an 
opportunity to amend his complaint, Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 
(3d Cir. 2002), any amendment in this case would have been futile because it is apparent 
from Redmond’s filings that he seeks to impose respondeat superior liability on 
Montgomery County.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“[A] local government may not be sued 
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”). 
 As Redmond’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. 
                                              
1
 Although a judge will be subject to liability under § 1983 when “he has acted in the 
clear absence of all jurisdiction,” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) 
(quotations omitted), reliance on ex parte communications does not, contrary to 
Redmond’s apparent belief, divest a court of jurisdiction.  Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769-770. 
